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FOREWORD
This document is part of the final report for the Operationally Efficient Propulsion System
Study (OEPSS) conducted by Rocketdyne Division, Rockwell International for the AFSSD/NASA
ALS Program. The study was conducted under NASA contract NAS10-11568 and the NASA Study
Manager is Mr. R. E. Rhodes. The period of study was from 24 April 1989 to 24 April 1990.
ABSTRACT
This study was initiated to identify operations problems and cost drivers for current propulsion
systems and to identify technology and design approaches to increase the operational efficiency and
reduce operations cost for future propulsion systems. To provide readily useable data for the ALS
program, the results of the OEPSS study have been organized into a series of OEPSS data books as
follows: Volume I, Generic Ground Operations Data; Volume II, Ground Operations Problems;
Volume III, Operations Technology; and Volume IV, OEPSS Design Concepts. This volume de-
scribes the major operational problems we have today and how they severely impact ground process-
ing, launch operations, and facilities. Potential options for solving the problems are presented.
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INTRODUCTION
The operations cost of today's launch systems has become a large fraction of the vehicle recur-
ring cost per flight, ranging from 20 to 40% for expendable and reusable vehicles, respectively. The
complex operations requirements of current launch vehicles have also limited our ability to achieve
routine access to space. Since the rocket engine/propulsion system represents one of the more com-
plex and expensive systems in the launch vehicle, a study was made to identify operations problems
(cause and effect concerns) that have driven operations costs to exorbitant levels. This volume de-
scribes the major operations problems encountered in today's launch vehicles and how these prob-
lems have adversely affected our ability to achieve serviceability, reliability, and operability. This
volume emphasizes the need to recognize and understand the operations problems and the effort
that must be made to avoid them in future designs; i.e., applying the "lessons learned."
CURRENT OPERATIONS PROBLEMS
Processing flight hardware for launch has been a very tedious and time-consuming task, requir-
ing large numbers of people operating sophisticated ground support equipment (GSE) to verify
flight system readiness. Each subsystem assembled for the major vehicle element requires total sys-
tem checkout before flight certification.
This process is complex and involves numerous other systems during the checkout. For exam-
ple, to support checkout of a main engine, the main propulsion system, electrical power distribution
system, hydraulic system, instrumentation system, flight control system, avionics system, environ-
mental system, and the purge, vent, and drain systems must all be activated to support the engine
checkout. The checkout itself also requires highly trained and skilled personnel at the vehicle, in the
firing room, and at the GSE to supply the required commodities like gases, hydraulics, power, etc. All
these activities, in turn, depend on test conductors, quality control, safety, GSE engineering, etc., to
accomplish a successful test. Many of these activities are "hands on" and serial in nature, which fur-
ther complicates the checkout process. The ground support system providing services and commodi-
ties also must be verified to ensure that every system is available and certified to support the test. It is,
therefore, not surprising that operations support for launch system checkout is complex, manpower
intensive, time consuming, and costly, and a launch system that consists of many separate, indepen-
dent systems simply exacerbates this problem.
A typical illustration of the technical disciplines and operations support required for flight sys-
tem checkout is depicted in Figure 1-1. An illustration of the large infrastructure of logistics, sup-
plies, equipment, and facilities to support the system checkout is shown in Figure 1-2. Every differ-
ent commodity required on the vehicle adds another tentacle to the operations support structure.
The requirement for Helium gas, no matter how small the amount, dictates the need for additional
facilities, GSE, logistics, and transportation to ensure that the gas is at the vehicle processing site
when needed.
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A recent SGOE/T study 1, conducted by Boeing Aerospace Operations for NASA Kennedy
Space Center, found current operational requirements are driven by:
1. Systems that are not readily serviceable
2. Too many people are required
3. Too much time is needed for processing
4. Complex support facilities are needed
5. Serial operations are required
6. Hazardous operations are involved
7. Too many commodities and grades of commodity are used
The current OEPSS study has identified some serious major problems involving the propulsion
system (which includes the propellant tankage, fluid system, and engine) that have plagued our oper-
ations requirements and compromised our launch capability. These operations problems, starting
with the most pervasive, include the following:
1. Closed aft compartment
2. Hydraulic system
3. Ocean recovery/refurbishment
4. Separate OMS/RCS
5. Gimbal system
6. Sophisticated heat shield
7. GN2/GHe purge
8. Excess interfaces
In view of current experience, it is manifestly clear that operational complexity stems from de-
sign. In order to achieve operational efficiency, operations must not simply support any design, it
must drive the design at its conceptual beginning toward greater simplicity and operability. The fol-
lowing sections of this volume list 25 major operations problems, or concerns, that should be miti-
gated or eliminated in future propulsion design to achieve simplicity, reliability, and operability nec-
essary to meet launch operations efficiency.
1Scholz, A.L., Shuttle Ground Operations Efficiency Technology Study (SGOE/T), NASA/KSC Contract
NAS 10-11344, Boeing Aerospace Company, May 4 1989.
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1.0 CLOSED AFT COMPARTMENTS,
OEPSS CONCERN 1
1.1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT
The impact on ground operations caused by a propulsion system contained within a closed
compartment is summarized in Figure 1-1.
1.2 REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND
The need for structural efficiency is one of the factors leading to use of closed compartments in
launch vehicles. Skin and stringer or monocoque type structures are strong and lightweight but, be-
cause their structural elements are large areas, tend to enclose volumes and form compartments.
Where hazardous fluids exist within the enclosed volume, ground purging is usually required to pre-
clude accumulation of these fluids as a result of possible leakage. This need for purging can then lead
to further sealing of the compartment to control the purge process.
Closed compartments may also be used to protect components from main engine heat or other
external environments. They also can be necessary to maintain pressure required for structural sta-
bility. The aft compartment of the STS Orbiter serves both functions as well as containing the inert
purge.
1.3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
A typical ALS vehicle contains a closed engine compartment similar to that on the Orbiter for
the same reasons. In addition, for the recoverable propulsion modules, the compartment protects
the contained components and subsystems from sea water contamination. Closed compartments
also are used in the intertank areas.
1.4 OPERATIONS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Closed compartments cause numerous ground operations problems because leakage of haz-
ardous fluids is contained, because access is restricted, and because GSE requirements are made
complex.
The fact that hazardous leakage can escape into a closed volume requires that volume be
purged on the ground with an inert gas to preclude accumulation of hazardous fluids. A detection
system is needed to ensure no dangerous buildup of gas. Both the purge and detection systems have
vehicle hardware, ground interfaces, and ground support equipment. All necessitate maintenance,
checkout, and servicing, which in turn demand a large staff of people to perform and support these
functions. The inert purge leads to the very real possibility that personnel can inadvertently enter an
environment that will not support life.
The restricted access caused by closed compartments also creates hazards for personnel. Inju-
ries resulting from contact with hardware when working in tight areas are common, and the limited
RI/RD90-149-2
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• Operational impacts
• Confinement of potential propellant leaks - criticality 1 failure
• Requires inert purging during loading operations
• Requires conditioned environment for personnel
• Requires sophisticated hazardous gas detection system
• Drives the requirement for sophisticated heat shielding
• Inhibits proper access to components
• Drives the requirement for specialized/dedicated GSE
• Imposes manloading restrictions for confined space
• Due to unnatural personnel passageways
• Elevates potential for hardware damage
• Additional interfaces required between vehicle and ground
• Requires sophisticated ground support equipment
• Environmental control system for personnel
• Gaseous nitrogen regulation and distribution system
• Must have redundant systems
• Capable of local and remote operation
• Requires an "army" for operation, maintenance, certification
• Adds another function to the firing room operation
• Tremendous risk to the safety of personnel and hardware
• Drives many operations to be serial in flow
• Drives need for LCC that could delay or scrub a launch
• Potential options for consideration
• Aft area should be completely open - Ref. SII and SIVB vehicle configurations
Figure 1-1. Operational Impact of Closed Aft Compartments
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accesscanprecluderapid evacuation in case of an emergency. Tight working areas also cause hard-
ware damage, require serial work, and complicate LRU replacement.
In addition to the GSE needed to provide compartment purging and hazardous gas detection,
the closed compartment requires that complex and expensive GSE be developed to support person-
nel access and permit LRU handling. Installation of this equipment, such as access platforms, can be
difficult and time consuming and must be done with extreme care to prevent flight hardware damage.
1.5 BRIEF PHYSICS OF PHENOMENON
N/A
1.6 POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEMS
The aft or boat-tail of the launch vehicle must be as open as possible, allowing any small
amount of propellant leakage to escape to the atmosphere. Free access to the engines and other
systems must be provided. A truss-work thrust structure might be ideal. Shielding from engine heat
must not restrict general access. Closing of other compartments must be avoided where possible.
Small compartments should be combined to form larger volumes where practicable.
1.7 TECHNOLOGY RECOMMENDATION
Develop arrangements of engines and structure that do not form closed compartments.
D600-0011/sis
RI/RD90-149-2
1-3

2.0 HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS FOR VALVE ACTUATORS AND TVC,
OEPSS CONCERN 2
2.1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT
The impact on ground operations caused by hydraulic systems for a propulsion system is sum-
marized in Figure 2-1.
2.2 REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND
The use of hydraulic fluid as an operating medium for thrust vector control actuators and large
rocket engine valve actuators has been common practice for most of our launch vehicles. Positive
action, quick response, and relatively compact size for modulating control systems make hydraulic
actuators very attractive, especially when there are large horsepower requirements for the actuator.
2.3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The basic elements to provide the required hydraulic fluid pressure to the propulsion system
components generally consist of a hydraulic pump, pump driver, hydraulic reservoir, hydraulic accu-
mulator, hydraulic filters, control valves, and associated plumbing, instrumentation, and controls.
Generally, the need to perform ground test and checkout dictates duplicate systems; therefore, a
ground-based system as well as a flight system are needed. The requirements for redundancy in the
hydraulic system essentially create the need for multiple and separate flight systems.
2.4 OPERATIONS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
A hydraulic system represents another fluid distribution system that must be processed and
maintained for flight operations. This involves distribution system leak checks, long periods of circu-
lation for de-aeration/filtering, operations associated with fluid sampling and analysis, and function-
al checks of all control systems. In order to process the flight system, ground support equipment,
generally consisting of all the basic hydraulic distribution system elements, must be duplicated to
simulate pressure for the flight system checkout. The same operations and maintenance require-
ments are also required for the flight system. In the case of the Space Shuttle system, the operations
problem is compounded by using hypergolic fueled auxiliary power units to drive the pumps. The use
of a hypergolic fuel dictates that operations such as fueling the unit be conducted with only a limited
number of personnel directly involved with the fueling operation and specially certified to work in
self-contained atmospheric protective ensemble (SCAPE). This type of system dictates serial pro-
cessing operations.
2.5 BRIEF PHYSICS OF PHENOMENON
Hydraulic actuation, whether for thrust vector control or valve control, requires that a nearly
incompressible liquid be distributed from the area in which the liquid is stored and pressurized to the
location of the actuator. The source of pressure, usually a positive displacement pump, may be pow-
ered by an electric motor from an engine-provided drive or by an auxiliary power unit. Actuators
RI/RD90-149-2
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Operational impacts
• Requires sophisticated ground support systems
• Expensive pumping units/control systems
• De-aerators/filters
• High pressure piping systems
• Both local and remote operating capability
• "Army" to operate, maintain, sample, and calibrate system
• Requires sophisticated flight hardware
• Auxiliary power unit/pumping unit
• Power units may demand lubrication equipment which may require cooling
equipment
• Control and filter systems
• "Army" to operate, maintain, sample, and calibrate system
• Requires long periods of circulation for de-aeration/filtering
• Potential source of contamination for valve actuators
• Another (2) fluid interfaces (minimum) between vehicle and ground
• Depending on APU propellants, can force processing into periods of area
clearing and serial operations
Potential options for consideration
• Electro-mechanical actuators
ii i
Figure 2-1.
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Operational Impact of Hydraulic Systems
for Valve Actuators and TVC
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maybe linear cylinders or rotary drives. Precise positioning of the actuator typically requires servo
valves with position feedback for control. Because the servo valves have very small clearances be-
tween moving parts, careful control of fluid contamination is required.
2.6 POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM
To alleviate the problems associated with a hydraulic distribution system, the use of electro-
mechanical actuators appears to offer the greatest potential for reducing operations cost associated
with actuation systems. Electro--mechanical systems also offer the opportunity to automate com-
pletely the test, checkout, and verification of system integrity.
2.7 TECHNOLOGY RECOMMENDATION
Develop low cost, reliable, compact, electrical actuators for large cryogenic valves and thrust
vector control devices that draw relatively low power.
1)600-0011/sis
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3.0 OCEAN RECOVERY AND REFURBISHMENT,
OEPSS CONCERN 3
3.1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT
The impact on ground operations resulting from ocean recovery of a propulsion system is sum-
marized in Figure 3-1.
3.2 REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND
The need to reduce recurring launch operations costs drives the program to consider recovery,
refurbishment, and reuse of certain flight hardware elements. The choice of water recovery would
appear to be the preferred concept, taking into consideration the potential for high costs of develop-
ing a fly-back (for dry landing) system for the launch vehicle. The ALS program has been evaluating
the concept of an ocean recovery of at least the propulsion and avionics (P/A) module.
3.3 SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION
Even though these are different concepts of effecfing an ocean recovery of the P/A modules,
the general approach is to:
• Separate the P/A module from the rest of the vehicle
• Deploy parachutes
• Land P/A module with engine thrust chambers up
• Attempt to protect critical hardware from water intrusion
• Bring the P/A module on board the ship
• Ferry the P/A module back to the launch site
• Refurbish
• Reuse
3.4 OPERATIONS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
The economic justification for ocean recovery of a liquid propellant rocket propulsion system,
based on observations made for the recovery of the relatively robust, spent space shuttle, solid rocket
boosters (SRB), is questionable. The present operations associated with the recovery and refurbish-
ment of the SRBs are time consuming and create the need for a unique infrastructure to support such
operations. Support of an AJ_S type and size module recovery, in addition to anticipated frequencyof
recovery, could require a support system that is several orders of magnitude greater than that which
exists today. Refurbishment of the SRBs has shown that sea water finds its way into everything, even
into "sealed systems" such as the hydraulic system. "Sealed patches" on the structure have been re-
RI/RD90-149-2
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• Operational impacts
• Vehicle stages and components recovered from performance-intensive opera-
tions require excessive refurbishment
• STS orbiter requires approximately 2 months of intense 7-day week, three-
shift operations to recycle for launch
SRBs require hazardous, tedious recovery from ocean impact, removal of
5,000 part-numbered components, cross-country shipment, and further in-
tensive refurbishment prior to reload. Dynamic water impact and galvanic
corrosion create highly significant component deterioration. Recycle time
exceeds 6 months
• Potential options for consideration
• Expendable low-cost vehicle elements
Recoverable elements that require only a bare minimum of refurbishment
• Low-pressure, low-rpm engines and turbopumps with simple operational
cycles and minimized support systems
Robust structures and components that operate at reduced performance
levels to assure long life and minimum rebuilding; "caterpillar diesels"
rather than "Indy 500 racers"
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Figure 3-1. Operational Impact of Ocean Recovery and Refurbishment
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movedonly to find corrosion from sea water intrusion. Cleaning the hardware was originally con-
ceived as being a "rinse-off" operation, but because of film left by the sea water, a labor-intensive
scrubbing of the surfaces is required. Verification of hardware condition both as a result of sea water
intrusion and impact load requires that all systems be disassembled for inspection.
3.5 BRIEF PHYSICS OF PHENOMENON
N/A
3.6 POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM
The two potential options for eliminating the labor-intensive and costly operations and infra-
structure associated with ocean recovery would be to develop either low-cost expendable systems or
fly-back systems for the entire booster.
3.7 TECHNOLOGY RECOMMENDATION
Develop low-cost expendable or fly-back systems.
D600-0011/Ijm
RI/RD90-149-2
3-3

4.0 MULTIPLE PROPELLANTS,
OEPSS CONCERN 4
4.1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT
The impact on ground operations and ground facilities resulting from the use of multiple pro-
pellants for the main propulsion system and auxiliary propulsion systems is described in Figure 4-1.
4.2 REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND
Multiple propellants, or commodities, have been used on various launch vehicles. For example,
one grade of liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen is used for the main propulsion system, a higher grade
of liquid oxygen is used for the fuel cell power plants, and storable propellants are used quite exten-
sively for spacecraft propulsion system and attitude control systems. The Saturn V vehicle utilized
many different propellants, including hydrocarbons, liquid hydrogen, liquid oxygen, hypergolic fuel
and oxidizer, and high-grade liquid oxygen-liquid hydrogen for the fuel cells. Also coupled to these
various multiple liquid propellant systems have been solid propellant devices, such as the current
space shuttle solid rocket boosters, the stage-0 solids of the Titan, and the Castor motors of the Del-
ta. In the case of the Titan and Delta vehicles, the solids evolved into the system as part of the propul-
sion system requirements to launch larger and heavier "payloads.
4.3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The launch site system required to support each of the different propellants is unique to handl-
ing each specific commodity. The liquid hydrogen loading system is a pressure-fed system using hy-
drogen vaporizers to pressurize the storage tank. The liquid oxygen system utilizes pumps to move
the fluid. The storable propellants are generally transferred by a pressure system. Some systems uti-
lize separate "loading carts" instead of the ground system. The solid propellants require their own
unique facilities to enhance safety, prevent contamination, and maintain the grain in the proper envi-
ronment. The hydrocarbons (RP-1) are generally transferred by pumps.
4.4 OPERATIONS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Each unique system for handling each commodity requires a separate "army" to operate that
system. Generally, the maintenance requirement for each of the systems is different based on the
specific hazards of the commodity. The highly toxic storable propellant must be handled by the
"army" that is certified for working in a self-contained atmospheric protective ensemble (SCAPE).
Operations involving storable propellant transfer require that the area be cleared of the "armies"
operating the other systems, thus dictating lengthy serial processing operations. Because different
grades of liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen are used for the main propulsion system and fuel cells,
each of these have separate storage and transfer systems on the ground, separate storage and transfer
systems on the vehicle, and, therefore, separate vehicle-to-ground interfaces. Each of these systems
has its own army to maintain the four systems, and the separate and multiple systems have require-
ments for separate gas purges and pressurization systems, both on the ground and on the vehicle.
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• Operational impacts
Multiple commodities require:
• Multiple facilities for storage and transfer
• Multiple headcount and administrative support
• Extra support for procurement/logistics
• Vehicle complexity necessary for multiple systems requiring multiple pro-
pellants/commodities
• Potential options for consideration
• Use LOX/LH2 for all considerations:
• Main propulsion
• OMS
• RCS
• PRSD/propellant-grade fuel cell
• APU
Figure 4-1. Operational Impact of Multiple Propellants
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Multiple propellant usage for launch vehicles prevents system integration and, therefore, prevents
reduction in multiple systems and interfaces, unique ground support equipment, and large number of
personnel required to maintain and operate all the different systems. The stacking of the space
shuttle SRBs also has created safety concerns for the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) and disrupts
other ongoing system activities until the lifting operations are completed. Depending on the location
of the SRB activity, at times the entire "low bay" of VAB is secured further hindering operation of the
other space shuttle elements that work in the unprotected bays and move about in the transfer aisles.
4.5 BRIEF PHYSICS OF PHENOMENON
N/A
4.6 POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM
The ALS has baselined a liquid oxygen-liquid hydrogen main propulsion system. Require-
ments for fuel cell power plants should be based on the same grade of propellant as the propulsion
system. The requirements for the OMS/RCS systems and/or retro-propulsion system should also be
based on the same propellants.
4.7 TECHNOLOGY RECOMMENDATION
Develop fuel cell power plants and OMS/RCS systems that can use propulsion system grade
liquid oxygen. (See OEPSS Concern 10 for OMS/RCS systems.)
D600-001 l/lira
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5.0 HYPERGOLIC PROPELLANTS,
OEPSS CONCERN 5
5.1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT
The negative impact on ground operations resulting from loss of parallel processing capability
is described in Figure 5-1.
5.2 REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND
Hypergolic propellants (earth storable propellants) have been attractive for propulsion sys-
tems of spacecraft, especially when long-duration missions are involved. These propellants do not
require special insulated tanks, no boil-off problems exist, and the need for a separate engine igni-
tion system is eliminated. Essentially, this type of propellant can be loaded well in advance of in-
tended use and lends itself to the quick deployment of a missile system by eliminating the time for
tanking at notification of need.
5.3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The present space shuttle orbiter OMS and RCS systems use earth storage hypergolic propel-
lants. These systems are generally pressure-fed, require no special insulation for tankage or feed
lines, and do not require a separate ignition system for each propulsive device. The ground distribu-
tion system is also a pressure-fed system located away from the launch pad. These highly toxic pro-
pellants create a major hazardous impact on ground operations.
5.4 OPERATIONS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
The impact of using earth-storable hypergolic propellants on launch operations is directly re-
lated to their high level of toxicity. All operations involving any system maintenance or propellant
transfer require special precautions to protect personnel from exposure to these propellants. Several
mandatory safety measures are put into effect as follows:
Only a limited number of personnel are allowed to support the operation on-site. All
personnel must be self-contained atmospheric protective ensemble (SCAPE) certi-
fied.
• The operation area is cleared of all other personnel not directly associated with the
task.
Essentially, this type of closed-area operation causes other work to stop and wait until the hy-
pergolic task is completed. All to often, personnel have had to evacuate the area because one of the
system components has developed a leak. On one occasion, a propellant leak reacted with adjacent
noncompatible material and started to smolder. On another occasion, one of the quick disconnects
in the propellant loading line disengaged from the vehicle fill port causing the propellant to spill over
the sensitive heat shield tiles, thus causing the tiles to debond from the vehicle. Recovery from this
mishap was a major unexpected cost for that launch. The closed-area operation thus becomes a
RI/RD90-XXX
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• Operational impacts
Loss of parallel processing caused by "area clear" evacuations required during
hypergol operations
• High cost in material and headcount for SCAPE-type operations
• Disposal of contaminated materials and fluids is expensive
• Separate, hazardous facilities required
• Personnel safety constantly in jeopardy
• Potential options for consideration
• Provide systems that use less hazardous storable propellants
• RP-1/H204, etc.
• Use existing prime propulsion propellants, i.e., eliminate hypergols (preferred
option)
• GOX/GH2, etc.
• Devise totally encapsulated system that is processed off-line and attached to
vehicle late in process to absolutely minimize safety concerns and hazard du-
ration (original goal of shuttle but design detail did not permit)
i i
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Figure 5-1. Operational Impact of Hypergolic Propellants
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serial impact to vehicleprocessing.Whenother test,checkout,and maintenance operations are in-
terrupted, whether planned or realtime, additional time and cost are added to overall processing
because other systems must constantly secure and reestablish their operations.
5.5 BRIEF PHYSICS PHENOMENON
N/A
5.6 POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM
Some options for consideration would be to eliminate the use of toxic propellant in the launch
vehicle, including the spacecraft, or to use encapsulated systems processed off-line and mated with
the launch vehicle late in the processing flow. Discussions in OEPSS Concerns 4 and 10 are also
applicable to this particular concern.
5.7 TECHNOLOGY RECOMMENDATION
See OEPSS Concerns 4 and 10.
I)600-0011/ljm
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6.0 POOR ACCESSIBILITY,
OEPSS CONCERN 6
6.1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT
The impact on ground operations caused by propulsion system designs with inadequate access
to components for checkout and maintenance is summarized in Figure 6-1.
6.2 REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND
The sheer sophistication of space vehicle flight hardware, the necessity of verifying its opera-
tional integrity, and the ability to safely remove and replace defective components drives the need for
proper access to all systems. This holds true not only for ground-based access structures, but for the
launch vehicle as well. Proper access must be considered for every position in which the vehicle may
reside when being processed for launch.
6.3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The configuration of the flight vehicle and its components, the use of enclosed compartments
("aft skirts"), and the allotted access openings will dictate the shape and size of "internal" access
platforms. These types of platforms will also have to be designed such that no more than two people
(and in some cases only one person) can install and remove them safely. The space shuttle orbiter aft
fuselage access platforms are an excellent example of supporting both horizontal and vertical pro-
cessing of the vehicle. The ground-based access systems are generally not so sophisticated and are of
a more robust design with more flexibility to allow access to the work area.
6.4 OPERATIONS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
The use of enclosed compartments for the propulsion and other support systems is the largest
contributor to the difficulty and complexity associated with accessibility at the launch site. The opera-
tions problem discussions in OEPSS Concern 1 are certainly relevant. The cost for replacing flight
hardware that was damaged because technicians did not have proper access for servicing the systems
located in the compartment has been extremely expensive. Replacement of avionics boxes on pro-
pulsion systems in the orbiter have taken at least five times longer than it would have been had the
component been readily accessible. Improper accessibility adds costs to the operations by placing
"man-loading" restrictions in the area with serial impacts to hardware processing. The inability of a
person to remove himself rapidly from a work area because of poor accessibility is also a serious
safety hazard. Ground-based systems for the most part have better access simply because the ground
hardware designer is completely familiar with the ground hardware requirements at the launch site.
The constant use of scaffolding, boards/ropes, etc., is good evidence that flight hardware designers
are not completely familiar with access platform designs required for flight hardware. A good case in
point is the profusion of boards/ropes needed around the SSMEs to service not only the propulsion
system but other vehicle systems as well.
RI/RD90-149-2
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i• Operational impacts
• Restricted access can cause personnel hazard
• Potential for hardware damage from personnel
• Restricted access can force serial work
• Increases complexity of GSE
• Potential options for consideration
• Design for ample access for checkout and servicing
• Provide provisions for easy removal of all LRU's
D600-001
Figure 6-1. Operational Impact of Poor Accessibility
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6.5 BRIEF PHYSICS OF PHENOMENON
N/A
6.6 POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM
The first order of business is to eliminate or drastically reduce the need for any type of enclosed
compartment. High-risk components must be located in areas for quick access and safe removal/re-
placement. Close coordination among flight hardware designers and access platform designers is
mandatory.
6.7 TECHNOLOGY RECOMMENDATION
More thorough investigation of heat shielding requirements in the aft portion of the vehicle to
eliminate the need for enclosed compartments with poor accessibility.
D600-0011/Ijm
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7.0 SOPHISTICATED HEAT SHIELDING,
OEPSS CONCERN 7
7.1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT
The impact on ground operations caused by sophisticated and complex heat shield designs is
described in Figure 7-1.
7.2 REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND
Protecting the aft portion of the launch vehicle, the propulsion system, and other support sys-
tems from overheating due to exposure to the rocket engine exhaust gases has been accomplished in
a variety of ways. The type of propulsion system, configuration, location, mission profile, etc., are
factors in determining the severity of heating by convection and/or radiation that may be experienced
in the aft area of the vehicle.
7.3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Most launch vehicles will have some type of thermal insulation on the aft base bulkhead. De-
pending on heat loads expected, these devices may be simple heat resistance panels and blankets or
highly sophisticated fibrous refractory composite insulation (FRCI) as used on the space shuttle or-
biter. Protective insulation for the engines might include "cocooning" the entire engine with light-
weight, fiber-filled, inconel-foil batts as was done on the Saturn V, F-1 engines. Insulation used on
the aft skirts of the SRBs is known as a Marshal spray-on ablative (MSA).
7.4 OPERATIONS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
The installation of insulation, whether it be simple panels, blankets, engine cocooning, or so-
phisticated heat shielding, is a time-consuming and manpower-intensive operation. Generally, this
heat shielding is installed late in the processing flow and represents closeout for flight. Any need to
gain access to service a component after heat shielding installation can significantly impact vehicle
processing at the most critical time in the vehicle flow.
The enclosed after compartment of the orbiter has created additional problems with heat
shielding. In this configuration, the shielding is accomplished by having engine-mounted heat shields
that move (when the engine gimbai) inside the dome heat shields (mounted to the base shield) with a
sealing device to protect the aft end of the vehicle against intrusion of hot gases. These shields and
their arrangement andmovement are best illustrated as the way the human eyeball works with the
open eye lid. The GSE to install and remove the domes is awkward; the domes are in two segments
and weight approximately 200 lb each. A multitude of fasteners is used to attach these devices to the
orbiter and engine and to secure splice lines of the segments. When major components of the SSME
require replacement, this shield has to be removed. A relatively simple component replacement tak-
ing approximately one shift is stretched to approximately 3 to 5 days because of the accessibility and
heat shield removal and reinstallation issues.
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Operational impacts
Potential options for consideration
• Spray-on foam insulation
• Insulation built into the component
• Local shielding only for critical components
• Relocate sensitive components
i iiii r
Manpower intensive due to weight and size
Means of fastening creates the need for "army" to accomplish
Generally a serial operation for closeout to launch
• Time impacts to remove dedicated heat shielding to gain access to a com-
ponent
Restricts ready access to components
Structure that is critical to combustion overpressure at engine start
Provides containment for cryo leaks or cryo condensate
i
Figure 7-1. Operational Impact of Sophisticated Heat Shielding
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7.5 BRIEF PHYSICS OF PHENOMENON
N/A
7.6 POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM
Several techniques should be considered to alleviate the problems associated with heat shield-
ing. If a component is sensitive to elevated temperatures, then consideration should be given to relo-
cating the component to a cooler location in the aft area. Local shielding and/or built-in insulation
for critical components that cannot be relocated should be considered as an alternative to total isola-
tion of the system from the heated environment. A thorough and realistic evaluation of the environ-
ment expected in the aft region should be made to determine whether the aft systems could be ac-
ceptably protected for the duration of the mission by using a spray-on foam insulation similar to that
used on the space shuttle's external tank.
7.7 TECHNOLOGY RECOMMENDATION
Use thermal insulation or local heat shielding of selected components, or relocate components
to lower-temperature areas.
D600-001 I/lira
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8.0 EXCESSIVE COMPONENT/SUBSYSTEM INTERFACES,
OEPSS CONCERN 8
8.1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT
The impact on ground operations caused by a complex propulsion system of many components
and interfaces is described in Figure 8-1.
8.2 REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND
Current launch vehicles are composed of numerous subsystems to accomplish the mission of
the vehicle. The types and number of subsystems can be the result of whether a vehicle is to be recov-
ered (space shuttle) or expendable (Atlas, Delta, etc.). In addition, the number of different compo-
nents and subsystems is the direct result of the autonomy required to support the concurrent develop-
ment of many subsystems. Since the engine is generally the long-lead time item, its development and
design freeze is driven well in advance of the vehicle propellant management system and, therefore,
drives the need for the engine to have its own avionics system, pneumatic system, instrumentation
system, etc., separate from the vehicle propellant management system. The vehicle system will also
require avionics, pneumatics, and instrumentation systems to support its development, which is usu-
ally done by a separate contractor and under the directi6n of a different design center. This practice
has the potential to lead to numerous and duplicate components, which in turn leads to numerous
and all-to-often artificial interfaces. The program requirement for developing standalone vehicle
components will have a direct effect on duplication of hardware.
8.3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
There are many examples which describe this OEPSS concern; however, the one that is most
recent, and represents this concern, would be the space shuttle orbiter propulsion systems. The or-
biter has a standalone main propulsion system (MPS) that supports a standalone main engine. The
orbiter also has an orbital maneuvering system/reaction control system that is completely separate
from the main propulsion system and the standalone auxiliary power units that drive the hydraulic
pumps. Each SSME is a standalone component that has all of the subsystems to support an engine
test whether it is in an orbiter or on the test stand. This then, for instance, leads to three separate
controllers and three separate pneumatic control assemblies. The standalone feature then produces
the artificial interfaces where it is connected to the orbiter MPS. Likewise, the orbiter MPS has its
own avionics devices, pneumatic system, and pneumatic distribution systems supplying each of the
SSME pneumatic control assemblies, there is also duplication of instrumentation on both sides of the
interfaces that supports standalone testing and checkout. The standalone OMS/RCS systems have
their own pneumatic storage and distribution systems which are completely separate from the MPS/
SSME pneumatic systems. Likewise, the standalone APU system has its own pneumatic storage and
distribution system which is completely separate from the OMS/RCS pneumatic system and the
MPS/SSME pneumatic system.
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rOperational impacts
• Every interface must be verified
• Leak checks
• Electrical checks
• Mechanical integrity checks
Potential options for consideration
• Integrate subsystems into larger subsystems systems
• Develop modules to replace components
t
Figure 8--1. Operational Impact of Excessive
Component/Subsystem Interfaces
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8.4 OPERATIONS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Standalone systems dictate the need for numerous and duplicate components (and support sys-
tems). This need, in turn, drives up the number of separate interfaces. Each standalone system pro-
motes artificial interfaces just for the sake of being able to remove an entire subsystem. Each inter-
face represents another "break point" in the system that must be verified should the connection be
broken. Each fluid interface represents a potential leak point requiring special attention for disas-
sembly, reassembly, and leak checks. Separating fluid connections leads to the potential for sealing
surface damage, which, in turn, requires repair of the sealing surface and, depending on the severity,
could even require a line changeout. Fluid connections also represent additional weight to the flight
hardware in the form of bolts, flanges, fittings, and, most of all, sophisticated and expensive seals. It is
not uncommon in a critical system containing helium, hydrogen, or oxygen to have to replace seals
more than once to effect an acceptable leak-free joint.
Systems carrying fluids such as hydrogen and oxygen necessarily dictate the use of sophisti-
cated, highly sensitive, and operations-intensive leak detection devices, such as mass spectrometers,
to verify the integrity of the seal. The requirement to use mass spectrometers for leak detection can
drive up the time to leak check a joint by several orders of magnitude when considering machine
start-up, run-in, and calibration times. High helium content in the surrounding area can cause leak
checks (using mass spectrometers) to be delayed until the background is reduced or add time to the
operation by having to encapsulate each joint that is checked. Leak checking joints can lead and has
led to time-consuming serial operations, impacting total system checkout.
The demating and mating of electrical connectors greatly increases the changes for damage to
pins. Minor damage, such as a slightly bent pin, may be a simple operation to correct vs the more
severe damage that could lead to a multipin connector replacement. In the case of the orbiter, sever-
al systems may have wires in the cable assembly with multipin connectors. The demating of this type
of connector could impact the operations of other systems as well as requiring time-consuming retest
of the functions passing through that connector when it is remated. (Replacing a single pin can be a
4-hr operation). Numerous standalone systems require numerous vehicle-to-ground interface to
service and communicate with the system. Each system requires its own separate and unique quick
disconnect with special installation and verification procedures, especially to support hazardous pro-
pellants.
8.5 BRIEF PHYSICS OF PHENOMENON
N/A
8.6 POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM
The elimination of time-consuming operations associated with the presence of numerous in-
terfaces is best addressed through hardware integration. Hardware integration could cross system
lines such that a single system might support several activities. For instance, multiple-engine vehicle
engine controllers might be integrated into a single unit (with built-in redundancy) located in the
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vehicle with the electrical interfaces located at the controller and controlled/monitored function.
The artificial interface between standalone systems is eliminated as well as those eliminated or re-
duced by eliminating multiple units.
This approach would be applicable to pneumatic systems as well. For modularizing systems,
such as an engine with, for example, a fuel module in which major items such as valving, pumps, etc.,
are packaged with sealed joint to reduce potential leak points, the module would be a line removal
unit (LRU) and not a separate component. Using common fluid systems to support several different
functions is another way to integrate hardware, reduce components, and drive down the number of
interfaces. An example might be the selection of a common propellant set such as discussed in
OEPSS Concern 4.
8.7 TECHNOLOGY RECOMMENDATION
Investigate and demonstrate integrated system designs wherein the same functions can be ob-
tained with fewer components and subsystems.
D600-0011/ljm
RI/RD90-149-2
8-4
9.0 LACK OF HARDWARE INTEGRATION,
OEPSS CONCERN 9
9.1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT
The impact on ground operations caused by lack of hardware integration, which results in nu-
merous components and interfaces requiring maintenance and checkout, is summarized in
Figure 10--1.
9.2 REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND
The discussion found in Section 8.0 for OEPSS Concern 8, Excessive Components and Inter-
faces, applies equally to OEPSS Concern 9.
9.3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
See OEPSS Concern 8.
9.4 OPERATIONS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
See OEPSS Concern 8.
9.5 BRIEF PHYSICS OF PHENOMENON
N/A
9.a POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM
See OEPSS Concern 8.
9.7 TECHNOLOGY RECOMMENDATION
See OEPSS Concern 8.
D600-0011/ljrn
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Operational impacts
• Leads to numerous interfaces
• Mechanical: adds weight; potential for leakage
• Electrical: adds weight; potential for connector/pin damage
• Increases number of components
• Standalone engine -- each has duplicate hardware
• Drives vehicle to have a similar system to support the engine system
• Increases probability of launch hold or scrub
• Drives ground support equipment costs up
• Increases requirements for replacement hardware
• The more components, the more maintenance, checkout, operation, calibra-
tion operations required, which drives the size of the "army" up
• Increased logistic support
• Drive reliability down
• Increases launch site flow time
Potential options for consideration
• Integrate hardware
• (1) Avionics package, (1) pneumatic package, etc.
• Minimize interfaces
• Occurs when using minimum number of components
• Multiple function hardware
• Use LH2 tank vent for the tank pressurization line in flight (if needed) and
for "tank loaded overflow" (instead of tank loading sensors)
D600-0011
Figure 9-1. Operational Impact of Lack of Hardware Integration
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10.0 SEPARATE OMS AND RCS,
OEPSS CONCERN 10
10.1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT
The impact on ground operations caused by using separate propulsion systems and especially
using different propellants, which is also hypergolic, is described in Figure 10-1.
10.2 REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND
In many launch vehicles, propulsion systems used for attitude control or for small velocity
changes (such as OMS) have been separate from the primary propulsion system. In many cases, three
separate propulsion systems are used (primary, RCS, and OMS). This provides maximum flexibility
and can allow one system to provide back-up to another.
10.3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
For those ALS type launch vehicles which are more than simple lower stage boosters, RCS and/
or OMS type propulsion systems will be needed. Some utilize the shuttle approach with individual
systems for each function. As on the shuttle, separate tankage for the RCS and OMS are used with
propellants differing from those used in the primary propulsion system. Typically, the RCS and OMS
propellants are earth storable hypergolics. The hypergolic propellants do not require tank and feed
system insulation as do the cryogenic primary propellants and do not require an ignition system for
each thruster. However, use of hypergolics has a major impact on ground operations.
10.4 OPERATIONS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Ground operations are complicated by the fact that with separate RCS, OMS, and primary or
main propulsion systems (MPS), each vehicle subsystem has its own set of checkout and servicing
requirements supported by separate groups of personnel and GSE. Duplication of actions necessi-
tates added functions and leak checks. The different propellants necessitate multiple propellant faci-
lities, each with its own support crew.
Ground operations are further complicated if hypergolic propellants are used. Their toxic char-
acteristics require the use of special equipment and procedures for personnel protection. Overall
vehicle processing time is increased because vehicle access is restricted during hypergolic servicing
precluding concurrent work on other subsystems.
10.5 BRIEF PHYSICS OF PHENOMENON
N/A
10.6 POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM
As a minimum, all propulsion requirements, other than the MPS, should be combined into a
single subsystem, with common tankage and propellant distribution. This single subsystem would
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Operational impacts
• Maintenance and prelaunch checkout of multiple tankage and associated sys-
tems
• Added functional component checks
• Added leak check
• Filling of separate tank systems
• If earth storable propellants used
• Hazards
• Added serial processing time
Potential options for consideration
• Combine OMS and RCS with common tankage and propellant distribution
• Integrate total propulsion system -- MPS, OMS, and RCS
I ii I I "
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Figure 10--1. Operational Impact of Separate OMS and RCS
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serveasboth RCSandOMS.A more operationally efficient approach would combine all the propul-
sion requirements into a single integrated system. Common cryogenic tankage would provide pro-
pellants for MPS and RCS. The OMS function would be provided by the MPS.
10.7 TECHNOLOGY RECOMMENDATION
Continue development of an integrated propulsion system. Ref.: Integrated Hydrogen/Oxygen
Technology (IHOT) study (NASA-LeRC contract to Rockwell).
D600-0011/ljm
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11.0 PNEUMATIC SYSTEM FOR VALVE ACTUATION,
OEPSS CONCERN 11
11.1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT
The impact on ground operations caused by service, checkout, and verification of the storage,
regulation, and distribution systems is described in Figure 11-1.
11.2 REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND
Pneumatic actuation of cryogenic valves is an effective method of isolating the electrical con-
trol system from the cryogenic environment. The pneumatic pressure acting on a cylinder can pro-
vide the force needed to actuate even large valves.
11.3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
A typical valve actuation system requires a central helium storage and regulation subsystem
with pressure lines to each valve. One or more solenoid valves at each cryogenic valve responds to
commands from the vehicle avionics system to control helium pressure to the cryogenic valve. The
helium then pressurizes one or more pneumatic cylinder.s which open or close the valve. Therefore,
the total control system for each valve consists of an electrical system and a pneumatics system.
11.4 OPERATIONS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Since cryogenic valves are distributed throughout the vehicle (tank vent valves, propellant fill
and drain valves, engine control valves, etc.), a long network of high pressure helium lines is required
throughout much of the vehicle. These lines, as well as the complete helium storage and control sys-
tem, must be leak checked to assure the helium supply is not depleted during the mission. Functional
verification is needed for all the regulators, isolation valves, and valve control solenoids in the pneu-
matic system. All the components in the pneumatic system have logistics and maintenance require-
ments in addition to this checkout. Prelaunch servicing of the pneumatic system involves charging the
helium storage system to flight pressure from a complex, launch-critical, set of GSE, which must also
be maintained and serviced.
In addition to the operations associated with the pneumatics system, a complete avionics sys-
tem for each cryogenic valve also must be maintained, checked out, and serviced. This requires not
only a separate and parallel set of vehicle hardware, but a separate set of GSE and a separate group
of people to maintain, check out, and service both the vehicle and ground hardware.
11.5 BRIEF PHYSICS OF PHENOMENON
For small valves in ambient applications, a direct acting solenoid actuator is usually used. For
larger sized valves, the electrical power required to drive the necessary large solenoid is high. For a
cryogenic valve, the solenoid actuator should be isolated from exposure to the low temperature. The
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Figure 11-1.
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Operational impacts
• Additional flight hardware requiring joint-to-joint checkout
• Requires on-board storage tanks, regulation/distribution system
• Requires redundant regulation/relief systems
• Additional interfaces required between vehicle and ground
• Multiplies instrumentation requirements
• Requires sophisticated ground support equipment
• Must have redundant regulation/distribution system
• Capable of local and remote operation
• Requires an "army" for operation, maintenance, certification
• Adds another function to the firing room operation
• Imposes labor-intensive cleanliness verification on system
Potential options for consideration
• E1ectromechanical actuators
D600-0011
Operational Impact of Pneumatic System for Valve Actuation
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typical pneumatically actuated valve avoids these problems, but with the described impact on ground
operations.
11.6 POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM
Duplication of control systems (electrical and pneumatic) for each valve must be avoided. Since
the command signal from the computer is electrical and an electrical system is operationally much
simpler than an equivalent pneumatic system, the choice is to electrically actuate all valves. Smaller
valves can continue to be direct acting solenoids; others can use solenoid pilots operating with system
fluid pressure or electromechanical actuators.
11.7 TECHNOLOGY RECOMMENDATION
Low-cost, reliable, electrical actuators for large cryogenic valves that draw relatively low pow-
er are needed.
D600-0011/Ijm
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12.0 GIMBAL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS,
OEPSS CONCERN 12
12.1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT
The impact on ground operations caused by the complexity of the gimbal system and its mainte-
nance requirement is described in Figure 12-1.
12.2 REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND
Because of unpredictable variations in factors (such as winds and engine thrust differences)
that affect the flight path, active steering is needed during the powered portion of the flight. The
traditional method of steering a high thrust rocket launch vehicle is to control the thrust vector by
gimballing each of the main engines with hydraulic actuators.
12.3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
A typical thrust vector control system gimbals each main engine with two hydraulic cylinders
operating in planes 90 deg apart. The pump that provides the necessary hydraulic pressure may be
driven either from the main engine or another power source such as an electric motor or auxiliary
power unit. High pressure supply and return lines carry the flow to and from the actuators. Flexible
hoses in the lines accommodate engine gimbal motion.
12.4 OPERATIONS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
The hydraulically driven thrust vector control system results in a number of operational im-
pacts. The complex system of hydraulic pumps, pump drives, hydraulic lines and fittings, control
valves, hydraulic cylinder actuators, gimbal bearings, and control system can be difficult to maintain,
service, and checkout. See OEPSS Concern 2 for further discussion of hydraulic systems operations
problems.
12.5 BRIEF PHYSICS OF PHENOMENON
See OEPSS Concern 2.
12.6 POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM
An operationally efficient approach to providing flight control should simplify the system by
replacing the hydraulic cylinders with electromechanical actuators (EMA). Gimbal only those en-
gines necessary for thrust vector control with the remaining engines stationary. If possible, hinge
each engine in one plane with a single actuator. Alternate methods of thrust vector control such as
differential throttling, gas generator exhaust vectoring, or vanes in the exhaust stream should be eva-
luated.
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iOperational impacts
• System complexity: actuator system, gimbal bearings, control system
• Maintenance
• Servicing
• Prelaunch checkout
• Hydraulics -- addressed in OEPSS 2
Potential options for consideration
• Simplify system
• EMAs replace hydraulic cylinders
• Consider reducing number of engines gimballed
• Hinge instead of gimbal
• Consider alternate methods of TVC
• Differential throttling
• GG exhaust vectoring
• Vanes
Figure 12-1. Operational Impact of Gimbal System Requirements
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12.7 TECHNOLOGY RECOMMENDATION
Develop large EMAs and differential throttling for thrust vector control.
13600-0011/ljm
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13.0 HIGH MAINTENANCE TURBOPUMPS
OEPSS CONCERN 13
13.1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT
The impact on ground operations caused by stringent functional checkout required for a com-
plex and sensitive component, especially if the component is recovered and qualified for reuse, is
described in Figure 13-1.
13.2 REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND
Rocket engine propellant pumps use turbine drives for their prime movers because of the high
horsepower requirements, and their ability to be close coupled to result in a very compact size. These
turbines are driven either by "hot gas" from hot gas generators or "cold gas" from expansion of
heated hydrogen fuel. Extremely high rotating speeds and loads imposed on the hardware during
operation require a thorough inspection of the unit prior to its next use.
"Breakaway" and "Running" torque measurements, along with shaft axial travel measure-
ments, for turbomachinery is an accepted method of verifying its integrity to support the next test or
mission requirement. Fiber optic inspection of bearings; impellers, turbine end hardware, and leak
check of the pump/turbine internal seal package completes the general inspection/test/checkout for
reusable turbopump machinery.
13.3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
N/A
13.4 OPERATIONS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
The continual need to evaluate axial shaft travel and breakaway/running torque for turboma-
chinery has posed serial time constraints on ground operations in the past. Access to perform these
operations requires that ports be opened to gain access to the end of the turbopump shaft. Special
tooling is required to act as a guide and provide a support base for the measuring instruments. In
some cases, multiple readings must be taken to insure that the data is representative of any small
changes that may have occurred since the previous measurements. After the GSE is removed, the
ports must be closed and leak checked to insure a leak-tight condition. Depending on access to these
pumps, it is possible for the operation to consume a work shift or better depending on the type of
pump and accessibility to perform the task.
Detailed inspections of the turbine end necessitate the disturbance of sealed joints to gain ac-
cess. The use of fiber optic devices to perform the inspections is a time-consuming operation and
requires special skills. When borescopes are used, extreme care must be exercised to prevent the
"tip" from getting lodged in the crevices being inspected. These type of "hang-ups" have caused the
turbopump to be removed so that the instrument and any associated debris could be retrieved. De-
pending on the type of pump, this operation could taken six to eight work shifts.
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• Operational impacts
• Requirements for repeated torque and shaft travel measurements
• Final engine checkout/pump replacement
• Disturbing critical fluid joints for above measurements
• Potential for flange/seal damage
• Potential for introducing a leak
• Drives operation for repeated leak checks
• Requires heat shielding to be removed for access
• Potential for system contamination
• Requirements for pump removal for turbine-end inspections
• Potential options for consideration
• Use BIT/BITE for torque/shaft-travel measurements
• Lower speed and turbine-end temperatures
Figure 13-1. Operational Impact of High Maintenance Turbopumps
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13.5 BRIEF PHYSICS OF PHENOMENON
N/A
13.6 POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM
The use of built-in-test (BIT) and built-in-test-equipment (BITE) would offer solutions to
most of the inspection issues.
13.7 TECHNOLOGY RECOMMENDATION
Develop nonintrusive devices that will continually monitor and provide information on de-
mand on the health of the rotating machinery.
D600-0011/tab
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14.0 ORDNANCE OPERATION,
OEPSS CONCERN 14
14.1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT
Ordnance operation causes a severe and widespread impact on ground operations in that it
poses a serial time constraint and suspends all other ground operations in the area because of safety
requirements. See Figure 14-1.
14.2 REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND
Ordnance devices are used on all launch vehicles as a means of destroying the vehicle should it
deviate from its prescribed mission and pose a threat to the surrounding area. Explosive bolts are
used when flight hardware needs to be separated from the external tanks, such as in the space shuttle
orbiter. Explosive bolts are also used to separate the solid rocket boosters from the mobile launcher
platform. Other ordnance devices are used to insure that critical functions occur both on the ground
and with other flight hardware (such as ensuring proper and timely umbilical carrier plate retraction),
to insure the orbiter landing gear deploys for landing, and for vehicle stage separation.
14.3 SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION
The pyrotechnic devices are basically a simple system when compared to other systems. An
explosive device is fired by electrical signal sent through hardlines, in the case of ground systems, or
by RF in the case of vehicle destruct systems. Of course, hardlines are used to activate these devices
onboard the flight vehicle when the vehicle system is programmed to do so.
14.4 OPERATIONS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
The major problem associated with using ordnance systems is that the installation, removal and
checkout of these devices dictates clearing the area of all personnel not directly supporting ordnance
operations. Other systems necessarily have to secure their work and then reestablish their operation
when the ordnance work is completed. Ordnance operations thus become a serial impact to vehicle
processing, and are a major cost driver.
14.5 BRIEF PHYSICS OF PHENOMENON
N/A
14.6 POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM
Solving this problem at present launch sites might be immediately addressed with reassessing
the need for area-wide evacuation for all ordnance operations. One other approach might be to con-
sider the use of more "benign" initiators such as laser systems. The long range solution might be the
substitution of laser type systems for all flight hardware ordnance.
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• Operational impacts
• Lossof parallel processingcausedby "area clear" evacuations
• Disposal of unusedordnancefrom recoveredvehicleelementsis hazardous
and costly
• Separate,hazardousstoragefacilities required
• Potential options for consideration
• Eliminate explosive ignition devices; replace pyrotechnics with lasers
• Eliminate explosive release and separation devices; replace with electrome-
chanical and Nitinol shape-memory alloy components
• Eliminate explosive range safety vehicle destruct devices; consider use of
ground-to-air military weapons perhaps assisted by vehicle homing beacon
Figure 14-1. Operational Impact of Ordnance Operations
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14.7 TECHNOLOGY RECOMMENDATION
A program to develop other systems that eliminate the present hazards of using ordnance. Con-
sider ground, airborne, and/or space laser systems for vehicle destruction.
The above describes the operational impact of small ordnance devices. Another big cost driver
at John E Kennedy Space Center is the ground operations of large solid rocket motors. The special
precautions imposed have severe serial impact on other ground operations; it creates another unique
and costly infrastructure and it is, at the present time, the "long pole in the tent" to restriction of
launch rates (the issue stacking time vs facilities to accommodate the stacking). Safety precautions
associated with the SRBs have severely curtailed the concurrent use of the vehicle assembly building
for other purposes.
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15.0 RETRACTABLE UMBILICAL CARRIER PLATES,
OEPSS CONCERN 15
15.1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT
The impact on ground operations caused by the complex carrier plate system that is used for
connecting umbilical between the vehicle and ground is described in Figure 15-1.
15.2 REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND
Maintaining "hardwire" communications with the flight vehicle, and the ability to service and
deservice the vehicle with various commodities, is mandatory right up to the point of commit to
launch. The criticality of maintaining "hardline" contact between the ground systems and the vehicle
is to be able to abort the launch safely at the last moment of time and immediately begin to deservice
the cryogenic propellants. Maintaining hardline contact with the vehicle gives the ground crew posi-
tive control of the vehicle systems prior to liftoff.
15.3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Maintaining "hardline" contact between the ground distribution systems and the flight vehicle
is accomplished through "umbilicals." The umbilicals include electrical wire systems as well as fluid
transfer system. The interface between the ground system and the vehicle is by quick release discon-
nects. As the fluid lines are separated, the poppets in the flight half and ground half of the quick
disconnect are spring-loaded to close to maintain integrity of the lines/vehicle from contaminates of
the environment and prevent leaks outside of the system. The separation of these quick disconnects
is most often accomplished by the ground portion of the disconnect being retracted (pulled away)
from the vehicle. In the case of the space shuttle, the umbilicals are set in a single carrier plate (one
plate for systems on the fuel side and one plate for systems on the oxidizer side). This carrier plate is
retracted through a series of complicated moves to insure proper unlatching of the plate from the
vehicle. An intricate mechanism of drop weights, cables, hinged-system-support frame, and closing
blast Shield, housed in an enclosure called the tail service mast (TSM), serve as the system to effect
the umbilical retracting operation and protect the ground portion from the rocket exhausts.
15.4 OPERATIONS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
The umbilical carrier plate installation on both the fuel and oxidizer side are labor-intensive
and time-consuming operations. The original concept of "gang" mating quick disconnects never ma-
terialized with any great degree of confidence. In many instances, the plate is attached to the vehicle
and then the disconnects are mated. The close arrangement of the disconnects to one another, pass-
ing through a relatively thick plate, presents access problems when a particular disconnect requires
attention or inspection. The access problem is compounded when work has to be performed at ele-
vated heights (on catwalks) and around the retract/support systems for the plate. If major problems
exist with a vehicle side disconnect, it is possible that the entire plate; i.e., all the other disconnects,
will have to be demated to gain proper access to the problem-disconnect.
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Operational impacts
• Multiple systems sequenced for plate retract
• Sequence initiation at commit
• Pyrotechnic system for retract
• Hinged vacuum jacketed lines
• Drop-weight systems
• Shock-absorber devices
• Plate latching and unlatching from vehicle
• Present "tail service masts" are enclosed
• Confined space for personnel
• Access to equipment is marginal
• Working from ladders and narrow platforms
- • Requires inert purging
Depending on design of plate - may require inert gas purging of inner cavities
High maintenance equipment
Potential options for consideration
• Liftoff umbilicals, no retraction of plates, separation occurs as vehicle moves
away
• Consider simple design and low cost quick disconnect to justify discarding after
launch vs expensive maintenance procedures
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Figure 15-1. Operational Impact of Retractable Umbilical Carrier Plates
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The retract systemis cumbersome.A combination of cables(positioned and tensionedto in-
sureproper plate rotation to unlatch from the vehicle),drop weights,shockabsorbersto stop the
weights,ordnancesystemfor sequenceinitiation, drop hood, safetylatches,etc.,arejust someof the
devicesthat makeup anelaborate systemto retract the umbilicals. The large number of fluid and
electricallines,alongwith the carrierplate, requiresalargehinged-at-the-bottom supportframeto
carry the systemweight and still be able to transition into the protective environment of the TSM.
The rotation of the carrier plate plusthe rotation of the supportframe about its lower (bottom) end
requires the fluid systemsto incorporate flex lines both at theplate and the lower end of the frame.
Becausethevehicle rocket motor/engine exhaust passes adjacent to the carrier plates, protec-
tive enclosures (tail service mast) are used to house the carrier plate once it is retracted. A drop shield
sequenced to close as the plate is retracted basically seals the TSM. The TSM even with the shield
represents a confined space and is a potential hazard to personnel entering the area. The compact
enclosure gives rise to steep ladders and narrow catwalks compounding the safety problem of work-
ing in the TSM. The carrier plates and tail service mast systems to support umbilical retraction is
time-consuming and requires an "army" to maintain.
15.5 BRIEF PHYSICS OF PHENOMENON
N/A
15.6 POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM
Reducing or eliminating the ground support infrastructure that is required for retractable um-
bilical may best be addressed by using "flyaway" or "liftoff" umbilicals. These umbilicals are de-
signed to separate from the vehicle as the vehicle moves away from its supports. The elimination of
the "carrier plate" concept will provide needed access to mate the quick disconnect properly and to
perform any disconnect servicing required with a minimum of effort.
15.7 TECHNOLOGY RECOMMENDATION
Investigate simpler "flyaway" or "liftoff" service umbilicals for vehicle to ground disconnect.
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16.0 PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM,
OEPSS CONCERN 16
16.1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT
The impact on ground operation caused by long pressurization lines and valves that are difficult
to access for checkout and service is described in Figure 16-1.
16.2 REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND
Pressurization systems are needed to provide correct propellant conditions at the engine inlets
and to ensure tank structural stability. Typically, the pressurant source is either a stored gas supply or
vaporized propellant.
16.3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Most current launch vehicles using hydrogen and oxygen propellants prepressurize both tanks
from a ground supply and then utilize an autogenous system after main engine start. In the autoge-
nous system, the engine provides high pressure gaseous hydrogen from the chamber coolant flow and
high pressure liquid oxygen which is vaporized in an integral or external heat exchanger. Flow to each
tank is controlled by a fixed orifice or a flow control valve. This system avoids the need for separate
gas storage and control systems.
16.4 OPERATIONS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
The autogenous system has long fluid lines from the engines to the top of each tank. Access to
these lines for maintenance and leak checking is difficult. Because of tank pressure limitations, these
lines cannot be checked at actual operating pressure without inserting a blanking flange. Included in
this conventional system are flow control valves which historically have been a source of many prob-
lems, especially the oxidizer valve(s) because of the internal operating environment. A system of
transducers, signal conditioners, and software, ensures control of the pressurant flow rate in re-
sponse to tank pressure changes. All these systems require support personnel and ground support
personnel for maintenance, checkout, and servicing.
16.5 BRIEF PHYSICS OF PHENOMENON
The ullage pressure of each tank must be controlled within an upper limit, usually a function of
allowable pressure stress in the tank, and a lower limit, either based on minimum allowable engine
NPSP or a minimum pressure for structural ability. These limits are not a single set of values, but can
change as a function of mission phase.
16.6 POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM
As a minimum, flow control valves should be replaced with fixed orifices. This requires that the
tanks be designed to accommodate the wider resultant pressure bands. Consideration should be giv-
en to the possibility of total elimination of the flight portion of the pressurization system by
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• Operational impacts
• Conventional system requires extensive maintenance and checkout
• Long plumbing runs from engines and ground interfaces
• Access for leak checks difficult
• May not be possible to check at operating pressure
• Flow control valves
• Inherently subject to problems because of operating environments
• Associated control system requires verification
• Transducers, signal conditioners, software, etc.
• Potential options for consideration
• Replace flow control valve(s) with fixed orifice where possible
• Consider elimination of system by ground prepressurization only
• Heavier tanks
• NPSP concerns
Figure 16-1. Operational Impact of Pressurization Systems
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pressurizingtheullagefrom thegroundprior to liftoff andallowing theullagepressureto decaydur-
ing flight. An evensimpler,andtherefore,moreoperationally efficient approach,would requireonly
the boil-off or vapor pressureto satisfyullage pressure,therefore, totally eliminating a separate
pressurizationsystem.
16.7 TECHNOLOGY RECOMMENDATION
Investigate possibility of eliminating active tank ullage pressure control.
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17.0 INERT GAS PURGING REQUIREMENT,
OEPSS CONCERN i7
17.1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT
The impact on ground operations caused by a sophisticated system of storage, distribution,and
control required for providing inert gas purge is described in Figure 17-1.
17.2 REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND
Inert gases, helium or nitrogen, are used to purge cavities and systems that might contain, or
have contained, hazardous fluids. Nitrogen or helium is used to insure that propellant leakage past
seal package(s) does not mix with each other. Engine shutdown purging of the propellant systems
safely expels residual propellant from engine systems.
17.3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
A typical inert gas purge system requires a central storage and regulation subsystem with a dis-
tribution system to each component or system requiring purge. Typical engine purging is initiated
during the cryogenic loading process through the use of electrical solenoids and may be continuous
or intermittent as required. Purging of the propellant feed system is terminated prior to engine start,
whereas turbopump seal package/cavity is purged continuously throughout engine operation. Purg-
ing of the propellant system is again initiated at engine shutdown for a short period of time to clear
the system of residual propellants.
17.4 OPERATIONS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Inert gas purging systems require high pressure gas storage, regulation/control, and distribu-
tion system both on the ground and on the vehicle. The flight systems must be leak checked to insure
that gas depletion does not occur during the flight mission. Ground systems must be validated,
sampled, and verified, as ready to support the next vehicle/mission. The gas supply systems also rep-
resent another ground-to-vehicle interface that requires maintenance. Support systems to meet
purge requirements also include electrical and avionics systems. Since mission success demands that
both ground and flight systems have redundancy, a minimum of two of everything doubles the opera-
tional impact of a single system.
17.5 BRIEF PHYSICS OF PHENOMENON
N/A
17.6 POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM
Design out of systems seal package cavities that must be purged to prevent mixing of propel-
lants. Consider propellant gases for propulsion system shutdown purges.
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• Operational impacts
• Requires sophisticated ground distribution/control system
• High pressure reduction/control system with redundancy
• Requires both local and remote operation capability
• Requires "army" to maintain, operate, sample, and calibrate
• Requires storage/distribution/control systems onboard vehicle
• Requires "army" to maintain, operate, sample and calibrate
• Redundancy requirement also drives gas storage to be double or greater
than what is needed
• Additional interfaces between vehicle and ground
• Firing room operations increased
• Additional consoles, software development, and manpower required to
operate system
• Drives the need for launch commit criteria that could delay or scrub a
launch
• Commodities require expensive logistical support
• Potential options for consideration
• Propellant turbopumps should be designed such as to eliminate the require-
ment for intermediate seal cavity purges; i.e., consider separating the pump
from the turbine
• Use propellant gases for propulsion system shutdown purge requirements
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Figure 17-1. Operational Impact of Inert Gas Purging Requirements
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17.7 TECHNOLOGY RECOMMENDATION
Investigate cryogenic propellant seal package systems that do not require purge.
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18.0
18.1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT
NUMEROUS INTERFACES,
OEPSS CONCERN 18
The operational impact on ground opeations by numerous interfaces, which increases the re-
quirements for inspection, checkout and maintenance, is described in Figure 18-1. The excessive
number of components used and the lack of hardware integration will lead to increase in interfaces,
which are described in OEPSS Concern 8 and OEPSS Concern 9.
18.2 REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND
See OEPSS 8 and 9.
18.3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
See OEPSS 8 and 9.
18.4 OPERATIONS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
See OEPSS 8 and 9.
18.5 BRIEF PHYSICS OF PHENOMENON
N/A
18.6 POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM
See OEPSS 8 and 9.
18.7 TECHNOLOGY RECOMMENDATION
See OEPSS 8 and 9.
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Operational impacts
• Fluid systems -- separable joints
• Potential leak paths requiring leak checking
• Torque -- relaxing with time/vibration
• Labor intensive for joint preparation, assembly, and leak checking
• Increases hardware, drives logistics costs up
• Adds weight to vehicle
• Drives reliability down
• Drives requirement for time-consuming and labor-intensive installation
and removal of insulation on cryogenic fluid lines
• Electrical systems
• Potential for connector damage
• Drives extensive end-to-end checkout
• Artificial interfaces -- just because of a nonintegrated component
Potential options for consideration
Integrate hardware, minimize number of components
Make vehicle as autonomous as possible to eliminate stage-to-stage inter-
faces
Consider "seal welding" for mandatory separable joints to minimize potential
leaks
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Figure 18-1. Operational Impact of Numerous Interfaces
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19.0 HELIUM SPIN START,
OEPSS CONCERN 19
19.1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT
The impact on ground operations caused by checkout and maintenance of two duplicate stor-
age, regulation, and distribution systems (vehicle and ground) is described in Figure 19-1.
19.2 REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND
Engine systems utilizing a gas generator turbine drive have typically required some form of
high pressure start assist fluid to provide adequate turbopump power to achieve sufficient pressures
to ignite and maintain gas generator operation. This requirement is caused by the nature of the cycle
since little energy is available at engine start command to initiate pumping of propellants. Previous
engines have used solid propellant gas generators, hypergolic propellants, or high pressure hydrogen
to achieve the required turbopump acceleration. These systems have required the addition of other
systems to the engines to operate them.
Current design practice utilizes helium as the working fluid to provide initial power to the tur-
bopumps. It was selected because existing engine systems already require helium for both the oxidiz-
er turbopump intermediate seal and propellant valve actuation; therefore, it does not introduce ad-
ditional fluid requirements to the system. This system is currently only applicable to gas generator
cycle engines.
19.3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The ALS gas generator cycle option utilizes the helium spin start. Helium is supplied to the
engine from a source located at the launch pad, supplied to the vehicle through an umbilical. At the
engine start command, the helium spin assist valve on the engine opens to provide turbine power for
pressure buildup. Another option to this configuration is to utilize the same umbilical used to supply
helium to the vehicle main propulsion system.
19.4 OPERATIONS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Since this is another use of pneumatics on board the vehicle, the same operations problems
described in OEPSS Concerns 11 and 17 would apply. The additional major concern would be that
the huge demand for helium to accomplish this start will significantly increase the onboard handling
capability. The anticipated large size of the system (i.e., lines and components) to flow the required
gas is expected to create additional processing and checkout problems in performing leak and flow
checks. This system will necessarily create additional support systems such as electronics, instrumen-
tation, and controls.
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• Operational impacts
• Additional flight hardware requiring joint-to-joint checkout
• Requires on-board storage tanks, regulation/distribution system
• Requires redundant regulation/relief systems
• Additional interfaces required between vehicle and ground
• Multiplies instrumentation requirements
• Requires sophisticated ground support equipment
• Must have redundant regulation/distribution system
• Capable of local and remote operation
• Requires an "army" for operation, maintenance, certification
• Adds another function to the firing room operation
• Imposes labor intensive cleanliness verification on system
• Potential options for consideration
• Cryogen spin-up system: utilizing liquid hydrogen being tanked; diverted to
holding bottle for pressure elevation and used at start sequence
• Tank head start
• SPGG start
Figure 19-1. Operational Impact of Helium Spin Starts
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19.5 BRIEF PHYSICS OF PHENOMENON
Two considerations drive the gas generator cycle engine to require some form of turbine spin
assist. First, this cycle utilizes high energy, high pressure ratio turbines since the gas generator ex-
haust gas can be dropped from a high pressure to ambient pressure levels unlike expander, staged
combustion, or other topping cycle engines. At the low pressure start conditions, the turbines provide
little power for the pumps.
This problem is compounded by the second consideration when the gas generator cycle config-
urations use tap-off propellants just downstream of the pumps to achieve the highest obtainable
turbine inlet pressure. This close coupling provides little heat availability to the turbine drive fluid
prior to gas generator ignition. This heat availability is key to tank head start even for engines with
low-pressure ratio turbines.
High pressure fluid spin assist is used to provide the initial pump power during the early stages
of the start sequence in gas generator cycles engines. This assist is removed when the gas generator
ignites, thus enabling the engine to increase pressures to mainstage operating levels.
19.6 POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM
There are several options to eliminate the helium'--assisted spin start for gas generator cycle
engines. One is to utilize another working fluid such as hydrogen, similar to the J-2 engine used on
the second and third stages of the Saturn V launch vehicle. This could be supplied in the form of
either high pressure gas from a compressor or by the use of a pressure vessel which is filled to a low
level with liquid hydrogen propellant and heated to increase the pressure of the vessel to the desired
level.
Another option which has been used on the J-2S engine program is the use of a solid propellant
gas generator. Such a system adds a canister to the engine which, when ignited, provides the neces-
sary power early in the start sequence to allow ignition of the liquid gas generator and subsequent
pressure buildup to mainstage levels.
19.7 TECHNOLOGY RECOMMENDATION
The only technique listed above which has not been adequately developed is the use of cryo-
genic propellants to pressurize the start bottle. This technology item could be easily validated in lab-
oratory testing.
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20.0 LIQUID OXYGEN TANK FORWARD,
OEPSS CONCERN 20
20.1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT
The impact on ground operations caused by long LOX feedlines with the LOX tank located
forward in the vehicle, resulting in potential geysering and maintenance problems, is described in
Figure 20-1.
20.2 REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND
The positioning of the two propellant tanks in a hydrogen/oxygen launch system is generally
dictated by vehicle mass properties requirements. Tank configuration is based on weight and man-
ufacturing cost considerations.
20.3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Proposed launch vehicles, such as ALS, typically have the liquid oxygen tank forward of the
hydrogen tank. Both are of conventional configuration, with cylindrical center section and forward
and aft domes. A cylindrical intertank structure joins the two tanks. One or more oxygen feed lines
are routed from the aft end of the oxygen tank around the hydrogen tank and to the main engine area.
This configuration locates the vehicle center of gravity forward for good control moment from en-
gine gimballing and can minimize tank manufacturing costs.
20.4 OPERATIONS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
The forward position of the main oxygen tank results in a number of operational problems.
These include geysering and propellant conditioning concerns during prelaunch operations and the
difficulty of checking and maintaining the required long, large-diameter feed lines. This arrange-
ment of structure and engine feed system is more susceptible to pogo problems than if the oxygen
tank were aft.
The high potential for geysering in the oxygen feed line is perhaps the most serious of these
concerns, since catastrophic failure can result. An antigeyser line (in parallel with the oxygen feed
line) into which a low flow rate of helium is injected prior to main engine start will provide a sustained
circulation of the liquid which precludes geyser formation. In systems such as the shuttle, termination
of the helium flow can demand an immediate and proper action to prevent a potential disaster. This
requires a very reliable ground and vehicle helium system backed up by trained personnel to con-
stantly monitor the system operation.
The long feed lines contribute to the problem of ensuring correct propellant conditions at the
engine inlet. This is especially critical prior to engine start when heating of the long lines can warm
the propellant so that engine start requirements are not satisfied. Continued bleeding of some of the
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• Operational impacts
• Potential for geysering -- Criticality 1 failure
• Time-critical operations required for on-pad abort
• Skilled/experienced engineer required for console
• Additional hardware and operations required
• Gaseous helium injection system -- flight
• Requires checkout/maintenance
• Requires ground-based regulation/distribution system
• Additional personnel required for system maintenance
• Additional interface between vehicle and ground
• Long LOX lines: additional checkout and maintenance
• Drives requirement for intertank structure
• Forces propellant conditioning of engine systems
• Pogo impacts
• Potential options for consideration
• Concentric tank configuration -- ref. SIB configuration
• Antigeyser lines
Figure 20-1. Operational Impact of Liquid Oxygen Tank Forward
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propellant at the engineinlet isa solution to thisproblem, but introducesanother subsystemwhich
alsorequiresmaintenance,checkout,andservicing.In addition, the bleed is terminated prior to en-
gine start, which limits countdownhold time after bleed termination.
Another operational problem resultsfrom the long oxygen feed lines. These lines, with their
interface flanges and insulation, must be maintained and checked out. The difficulty in performing
these operations is increased because of the large size of the lines and their location.
The oxygen tank forward vehicle configuration, because of the long oxygen feed lines, is sus-
ceptible to pogo. Any system needed to suppress pogo adds to the ground operations complexity.
20.5 BRIEF PHYSICS OF PHENOMENON
Locating the oxygen tank ahead of the hydrogen tank establishes a more forward location of
the vehicle center of gravity than if the tank positions were reversed. The resulting longer moment
arm from a gimballing engine provides more control moment for a given change in engine thrust
vector.
The geysering phenomena results when heating of the lower portion of the cryogenic feed lines
causes vaporization of some of the liquid. As the resulting bubbles rise, they expand, eventually co-
alescing into a single entity called a Taylor bubble which fills the complete diameter of the line. As the
Taylor bubble rises, it expels the liquid ahead of it from the line into the tank. When the bubble enters
the tank, it rises through the liquid into the ullage. Cold liquid at the bottom of the tank then rushes
into the empty line propelled not only by gravity, but by the low pressure ahead of it created by con-
densation of the vapor in the line. This column of liquid impacts a closed valve or other obstruction at
the bottom of the line with sufficiently high velocity to create a potentially destructive water hammer
surge pressure.
20.6 POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM
In an effort to reduce the ground operations impacts of the oxygen tank forward configurations,
alternate tank arrangements should be investigated. Options could include reversing the positions of
the hydrogen and oxygen tanks to reduce geysering and pogo concerns. An even better solution from
an operations standpoint would be to use long tanks in parallel, concentric tanks, or toroidal tanks so
that the bottom of both tanks is near the engines.
20.7 TECHNOLOGY RECOMMENDATION
Low cost methods of manufacturing the alternate tank configurations described above should
be developed.
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21.0 PRECONDITIONING SYSTEM,
OEPSS CONCERN 21
21.1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT
The impact on ground operations caused by continuous monitoring and checkout of the pro-
pellant thermal conditioning system is described in Figure 21-1.
21.2 REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND
Cryogenic propellants supplied to the engine inlet must be supplied at an NPSP level high
enough to prevent pump cavitation. This is especially critical during the start sequence when stagnant
fluid at the engine inlet has absorbed heat from the environment. The conventional means of provid-
ing acceptable propellants for engine start has been to circulate propellants through a portion of the
engine prior to start.
21.3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Although currently the _ engine design requirement provides for engine start without en-
gine bleeds, the operational impact of the conventional propellant conditioning system must be un-
derstood if return to these methods is to be avoided. The conventional propellant conditioning sys-
tem requires a complex system of pumps, prevalves, recirculation valves, bleed valves, and lines for
the hydrogen; and bleed valves, lines, and ground disconnect for the oxygen. In addition, control
systems and additional ground systems are needed.
21.4 OPERATIONS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
All elements of the conventional propellant conditioning system require maintenance, servic-
ing, and checkout. The critical prelaunch propellant temperatures and pressures must be continuous-
ly monitored to satisfy engine start constraints. Anomalies in any part of the preconditioning system
can cause launch delays.
21.5 BRIEF PHYSICS OF PHENOMENON
The propellant combined temperature and pressure at the engine pump inlet must result in
subcooled liquid so that cavitation (local boiling) will not occur.
21.6 POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM
The operational concerns associated with propellant preconditioning can be alleviated if the
engine is carefully designed to allow natural percolation to maintain the propellants at the required
prestart conditions. In addition, an extended start sequence can permit the engine to accept a wider
range of propellant pressures and temperatures during start.
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i• Operational impacts
• Added flight hardware
• Hydrogen recirculation system: pumps, prevalves, lines, etc.
• Oxygen bleed system: valves, lines, etc.
• Added ground hardware
• Disconnect, bleed line, etc.
• Pump power supply, controls, etc.
• Prelaunch operations
• Preconditioning procedures
• Engine start constraints
Potential options for consideration
• Design engines with natural percolation ability
• Utilize slow start sequence to accommodate wider range of propellant inlet
conditions
i i
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Figure 21-1. Operational Impact of Preconditioning System
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21.7 TECHNOLOGY RECOMMENDATION
Develop an integrated propulsion system that requires no bleed or prestart recirculation sys-
tem and can accept a wide range of propellant pressures and temperatures during the start sequence.
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22.0 EXPENSIVE He COMMODITY USAGE,
OEPSS CONCERN 22
22.1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT
The impact on ground operations caused by helium is the high cost of operations involved in
shipping, handling, storage, regulation, and distribution of helium gas, and is described in Fig-
ure 22-1.
22.2 REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND
Helium and other inert gases are used in rocket propulsion systems (including tankage) for
pressurization, purging, inerting, and as fluid medium for valve actuation. Liquid hydrogen at
-423"F drives the use of helium gas for its systems since helium (at -45°F) has a lower saturation
temperature than hydrogen. If helium has to be used for the liquid hydrogen propellant system and is
already mandated to be on board the vehicle, it stands to reason that it should also be used for the
liquid oxygen propellant system (rather than adding another pneumatic distribution such as gaseous
nitrogen for liquid oxygen).
22.3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
N/A
22.4 OPERATIONS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Helium is an expensive commodity when compared with other commodities used at the launch
site. The cost is directly related to the logistics of getting the helium to the location where it is used.
Helium is removed from the ground (from, for example, Amarillo, Texas), processed, and com-
pressed for loading into railcars for shipment to the launch site. At the launch site, a unique system is
required for handling, compressing, storing, and distributing the gas. The distribution system must
be leak free to prevent any loss of this expensive commodity. Constant monitoring and maintenance
of this system requires a dedicated crew. Major maintenance of system components is required, espe-
cially when high pressure helium flow can literally cut the seals apart. The presence of any inert gas is
always a safety hazard to personnel, particularly in a confined area.
22.5 BRIEF PHYSICS OF PHENOMENON
N/A
22.6 POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM
Use electromechanical actuators. Use propellant turbopumps that do not require He-purges
for the seal package. The possible use of propellant gases for engine shutdown purge.
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Operational impacts
• Logistics of getting helium to the user
• Railcar shipment/transfer of gas to holding facility
• Elaborate distribution/regulation systems required
• Continual sampling for purity and particulate
• Maintenance, operation, and calibration of the above systems
• Maintenance, operation, and calibration of pressure reduction and regulation
stations
• Improper use of valving creates major maintenance requirements
Potential options for consideration
• Design for storage and use at ambient temperatures
• Use SPGG or tank head start (eliminate tank prepressurization)
• Eliminate turbopump "intermediate" seal cavities by physically separating tur-
bine and pump
• Use residual "propellant gases" for propulsion system shutdown purges
• Explore the use of less expensive gas (gaseous nitrogen) for large tankage
blanket pressures
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Figure 22-1. Operational Impact of Expensive He Commodity Usage
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22.7 TECHNOLOGY RECOMMENDATION
Investigate EMA for actuators, purgeless pump designs, cryogen spin-up engine start, and
purgeless engine shutdown to reduce dependency on helium.
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23.0 LACK OF HARDWARE COMMONALITY,
OEPSS CONCERN 23
23.1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT
The impact on ground operations caused by lack of hardware commonality, producing serious
logistic, spares, maintenance, and flight hardware support problem, is described in Figure 23-1.
23.2 REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND
Hardware commonality has not been a requirement between and across the separate and dif-
ferent types of systems. Hardware commonality among separate system is necessarily an operational-
ly and fiscally responsible requirement.
23.3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
N/A
23.4 OPERATIONS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
The lack of hardware commonality creates a logistics nightmare when considering the number
of different parts requiring huge inventory/staging areas. Cataloging, receiving, inspection, spares
provisioning, maintaining integrity, shipping/receiving, part recall/restocking, shelf life verification,
purchasing, dispositioning, etc., are just a few of the functions that create an entire "army" to support
flight hardware processing at the launch site. Unique hardware necessarily creates "special run"
manufacturing procedures, driving piece-part cost up and tends to create operational impacts
through hardware shortages. The different types of hardware tend to promote one-of-a-kind proce-
dures to refurbish the component along with unique system procedures to address the installation/
removal/checkout of the special parts.
23.5 BRIEF PHYSICS OF PHENOMENON
N/A
23.6 POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM
Systems should be designed to promote hardware commonality, especially in the propellant
feedlines. Feedline design (size, shape, and material) should be made common for both fuel and oxi-
dizer. Propellant feedline valving should be interchangeable between fuel or oxidizer. Modularizing
pneumatic regulations and control systems should be considered to enhance hardware commonality.
23.7 TECHNOLOGY RECOMMENDATION
N/A
D600-001 l/lab
RI/RD90-149-2
23-1
f rrr
Operational impacts
Creates a logistic nightmare -- gigantic inventory areas
Drives cost of hardware up
Tends to create hardware shortages
Increases number of procedures for operations
• InstalIation/removal
Potential options for consideration
• Design/arrange systems to maximize piping commonality
• Select valving for interchangeability
• Modularize fluid regulation/control systems
• Maintenance
• Repair
Drives interchangeability possibilities down
Increased changeout time due to unique operations requirements
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Figure ?.3-1. Operational Impact of Lack of Hardware Commonality
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24.0 CONTAMINATION,
OEPSS CONCERN 24
24.1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT
The impact on ground operations caused by contamination, and the time consuming effort to
identify and correct the problem, is described in Figure 24-1.
24.2 REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND
Contamination in aerospace fluid systems is a major source of operational problems. Because
dynamic components frequently have close fits between moving parts, control of particulate contam-
ination is required. Incompatibility between fluids or with materials exposed to the fluids requires
strict control of the chemical purity of the system fluids.
24.3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The typical aerospace fluid system controls chemical purity and particulate contamination by
sampling and analyzing fluids prior to introduction into the system. Systems are carefully isolated
from the environment as much as possible. Interface filters guard against particles from ground fluid
supplies.
24.4 OPERATIONS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Problems that are a direct result of contamination have had a major impact on ground opera-
tions. Rigorous cleanliness controls have been required to reduce the possibility of Criticality 1 fail-
ures due to contamination, particularly in oxygen systems. Component problems caused by contami-
nation have resulted in time-consuming component replacement and checkout and have caused
launch delays.
24.5 BRIEF PHYSICS OF PHENOMENON
N/A
24.6 POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM
The operationally efficient propulsion system must utilize adequate system and component fil-
ters. It should develop components less sensitive to contaminants using proper materials and ade-
quate clearances.
24.7 TECHNOLOGY RECOMMENDATION
Investigate the development of contamination tolerant components.
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• Operational impacts
• Potential for Criticality 1 failures
• Particulate impact in oxygen systems
• Requires rigorous controls
• Component failures
• Impacts launch schedule
• Time-consuming replacement and checkout
• Potential options for consideration
• Utilize system and component filters
• Design components less sensitive to contaminants
• Proper materials
• Adequate clearances
Figure 24-I. Operational Impact of Contamination
i
D600-0011
RI/RD90-149-2
24-2
25.0 SIDE-MOUNTED BOOSTER LAUNCH VEHICLE,
OEPSS CONCERN 25
25.1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT
The impact on ground operations caused by a side-mounted launch vehicle is quite substantial.
Compared to a stage-and-a-half vehicle, the operational complexity, manpower, and flow time are
more than doubled as described in Figure 25-1.
25.2 REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND
Present practice of launching large payloads to orbit requires staging hardware during ascent.
To avoid the use of critical ground systems (T-O swing arms), the vehicle has the booster element
side-mounted. This technique is required to allow the design, development, and procurement of sep-
arately built booster elements.
25.3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Side-mounted booster stages are designed to allow independent ground checkout, handling,
and servicing at the launch site. The booster element contains propellant tanks, prepressurization,
and engine feed systems; engines, pneumatics control, and purge systems; TVC and electrical engine
instrumentation, and controls. The servicing requires flight umbilicals and supporting mechanical
and fluid ground systems. The booster element must either be supported by a ground support and
holddown/release system or be supported by the core element.
25.4 OPERATIONS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
The separate booster element requires much manpower and time to perform checkout, handl-
ing, and mating to the core element. It also requires separate propellant tanking interface systems,
along with distribution and fluid controls systems. If the booster element is supported and held down
separately, the cryogenic shrinkage will imPose very large pinch loads in both the core and booster
elements, which will impose constraints on the servicing operation. If the booster is only supported
by the core vehicle, the umbilicals will be required to take very large motions from cryogenic shrink-
age and engine start-twang functions. Separate software will be required to load propellant into the
booster because of its traditional unique requirements. Software and hardware will be required to
perform ground pressurization and verify that engine start parameters are met. The booster engine
will be canted, to allow reduced control angles, that will require engine removal GSE to be unique
and difficult to use. The side drift at liftoff will impost additional ground systems to control the in-
duced environment for both the flight vehicle and ground systems. The side-mounted booster ele-
ment more than doubles the ground systems and functions and results in a very large impact on man-
power and flow time at the launch site. The separate booster element also has this similar impact on
operations in requiring development center support.
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Operational impacts
Doubles the tanking systems (at the vehicle)
Doubles the tanking systems distribution/control skids
Doubles the tank ground pressurization systems
Doubles the number of vehicle-to-ground interfaces
Drives booster engines to canted installation to reduce gimbal angle require-
ments
• Increase complexity of engine R&R, GSE
• Adds complexity to systems required for tanking operations to compensate for
loads induced in connected fixed tanks due to shrinkage from cryogenics
• Liftoff drags flame across platform and systems adding to refurbishment opera-
tions and costs
• Increases propulsion flight hardware checkout, i.e., separate tanks, pressuriza-
tion system, feed systems, control valves, instrumentation, etc.
• Doubles ground control consoles and software
• Adds complexity to hoiddown and release systems and clearance to prevent
contact with facility systems
Potential options for consideration
• Stage-and-a-half vehicle with fall-away booster hardware -- Atlas vehicle
concept and possibly drop tanks if required
i i
D600-0011
Figure 25-1. Operational Impact of Side-Mounted Booster Launch Vehicles
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25.5 BRIEF PHYSICS OF PHENOMENON
When the booster and core elements are both supported and tied down, the cryogenic condi-
tioning causes the contraction of materials of the booster and core tanks and results in a reduction in
their diameters. This reduction in tank diameters imposes lateral loads in the integrated stack or
buckling of the tank aft bulkheads. Added pressure is then sometimes used to try and stabilize the
structure.
25.6 POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM
Use only single stage or stage-and-a-half vehicle configurations. When more payload carrying
capability is needed, build a larger vehicle and do not try to accommodate the higher payload by
adding another side-mounted booster element.
25.7 TECHNOLOGY RECOMMENDATION
N/A
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